VOLUME 13 | NUMBER 2 | fEBRUaRy 2010 nature neuroscience B r i e f c o m m u n i c at i o n s Individual social value orientation 1 determines behavior in economic games and many real-life situations 2 . Prosocials are defined as those who like to maximize the sum of resources for the self and the other, while simultaneously minimizing the difference between the two. By contrast, individualists like to maximize resources for the self, while competitors like to maximize the difference between the two. The question we address here is whether prosocial attitudes depend upon deliberate top-down control of selfish impulses 3 or on automatic inequity aversion 4 , and what their neural substrates are. In the former case, we would expect prosocial attitudes to be associated with greater prefrontal activity 3 , whereas the insula 5,6 or amygdala 7, 8 would be involved in the latter case.
Methods). In the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner, the subjects were presented with a pair of rewards for the self and the other. They were asked to evaluate the desirability of the reward pair on four different levels (least preferable (1) to most preferable (4)) by a button press. Each subject's evaluation was linearly regressed with the reward for the subject (R s ), the reward for the other (R o ) and the absolute value of their difference (D a ) as implicated in the theory of social value orientation 1 , yielding coefficients W Rs , W Ro and W D , respectively (Supplementary Fig. 1 ). The two groups differed markedly in their response to the absolute reward difference, W D (t 34 = 6.68, P < 0.00001; Fig. 1c) . The prosocials disliked large absolute differences in distributions (inequity aversion), whereas the individualists were unaffected by such differences. In contrast, individualists preferred higher self rewards (W Rs ; t 34 = 6.54, P < 0.00001; Fig. 1c ), but were indifferent to other rewards (W Ro ; Fig. 1c) .
To identify the neural substrates corresponding to these behavioral differences, we conducted a regression analysis of functional MRI (fMRI) data at the time of reward pair presentation with three explanatory variables: the reward for the subject (R s ), the reward for the other (R o ) and the absolute value of their difference (D a ) using statistical parameter mapping 9 'Social value orientation' characterizes individual differences in anchoring attitudes toward the division of resources. Here, by contrasting people with prosocial and individualistic orientations using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we demonstrate that degree of inequity aversion in prosocials is predictable from amygdala activity and unaffected by cognitive load. This result suggests that automatic emotional processing in the amygdala lies at the core of prosocial value orientation. 
B r i e f c o m m u n i c at i o n s
The dorsal amygdala 10 was the only area where the groups differed in the correlation of activity with the absolute value of reward difference D a (Fig. 2a , P < 0.001; uncorrected). This activity was positively correlated with D a in prosocials but slightly negatively correlated in individualists. The amygdala activity increased only in prosocials when the absolute value of reward difference D a was large (Fig. 2b , significantly positive 5 s after the reward pair onset (P < 0.01); and Fig. 2c) . The same effect was seen in the left amygdala with weaker significance (P < 0.005, uncorrected; Supplementary Fig. 2 ). In addition, the activity in the amygdala predicted individual differences in how much each person disliked the imbalance of reward (D a ). We found a negative correlation in prosocials (P = 0.029) but not in individualists (P = 0.69; Fig. 2c) .
Several other brain structures, including the insula, anterior cingulate cortex, striatum and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, also showed activity correlated with the absolute value of reward difference D a , but this effect was largely driven by trials on which the reward for the other R o was larger than the reward for the subject R s and did not distinguish between prosocials and individualists (Supplementary Table 1 and Supplementary Figs. 3-7) . Previous studies have implicated these regions in various aspects of decision making [11] [12] [13] and, more particularly, as responsive to offers that the subject considers to be unfair 5, 6 . It is possible that the lack of impact of social value orientation on activity in these regions arises because they are involved with more deliberate, top-down appraisals of outcomes that are unfair to the self 3 .
Because inequity aversion in the prosocials was associated with activity in amygdala and not prefrontal cortex, we hypothesized that this reflected a rapid intuitive response rather than deliberation. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a further behavioral experiment of the reward pair evaluation task in which we measured speed of response and applied a cognitive load to prevent the use of deliberative processes 14 ( Supplementary Fig. 8 and Supplementary Methods).
Twenty-four prosocials and eight individualists were instructed to evaluate the reward pair and press a corresponding button as soon as possible. They were also required to memorize a five-digit number sequence before the presentation of each reward pair, and their memory was probed after each evaluation. A high-load, random number sequence was contrasted with a low-load, fixed number sequence (01234). There were no differences between the groups in their performance of the memory tasks (Supplementary Fig. 9 ). As in the imaging study, the prosocials showed inequity aversion, whereas the individualists did not (F 1,30 = 12.98, P = 0.0006). However, there was no effect of cognitive load on inequity aversion for the prosocials (t 23 = 0.08; P = 0.94). In contrast, the individualists became slightly more competitive under cognitive load, showing greater dislike of higher reward to the other (paired t-test; t 7 = 1.94, P < 0.05; Supplementary Fig. 10 ). Evaluation times were also unaffected by cognitive load (Supplementary Fig. 10) .
These results suggest that prosocial value orientation is driven by an intuitive aversion for the iniquitable division of resources. Our findings highlight an important role for automatic intuitive processing in social interaction, in addition to the slow strategic processes that were the focus of previous studies [5] [6] [7] 15 using interactive games. 
